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I.	   Introduction:	  Climate	  Change	  Ideology	  and	  the	  Believer/Non-­believer	  Dichotomy	  In	  June	  2007,	  the	  American	  Association	  of	  Petroleum	  Geologists	  (AAPG)	  	  issued	  a	  statement	  moving	  from	  a	  dissenting	  to	  neutral	  position	  on	  anthropogenic	  climate	  change	  and	  even	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  say	  that	  “reducing	  emissions	  from	  fossil	  fuel	  use	  [is]	  a	  worthy	  goal”	  	  (AAPG,	  2007).	  This	  change	  in	  position	  was	  significant	  as	  the	  AAPG	  was	  the	  last	  professional	  scientific	  body	  to	  reverse	  a	  previous	  position	  of	  fully	  dissenting	  to	  the	  anthropogenic	  climate	  change	  hypothesis	  (ACC).	  To	  date,	  all	  other	  scientific	  bodies	  either	  concur	  with	  the	  hypothesis	  or,	  like	  the	  AAPG,	  remain	  non-­‐committal.	  Those	  concurring	  include	  the	  national	  academies	  of	  science	  from	  32	  developed	  and	  developing	  countries	  including	  India	  and	  China,	  professional	  scientific	  societies	  such	  as	  the	  American	  Physical	  Society,	  European	  Physical	  Society,	  and	  Royal	  Society,	  and	  human	  health	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  American	  Medical	  Association,	  World	  Federation	  of	  Public	  Health	  Associations,	  and	  World	  Health	  Organization.	  Although	  some	  individual	  scientists	  within	  the	  community	  continue	  to	  dissent,	  they	  represent	  roughly	  a	  2%	  minority	  (Anderegg	  et.	  al.,	  2010).	  While	  near	  consensus	  among	  experts	  does	  not	  constitute	  a	  scientific	  argument,	  and	  majority	  bodies	  of	  scientific	  experts	  have	  certainly	  been	  mistaken	  before,	  the	  scientific	  arguments	  themselves—consideration	  of	  which	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper—and	  other	  evidence	  supporting	  the	  anthropogenic	  climate	  change	  hypothesis	  is	  overwhelming	  and	  is	  sufficiently	  compelling	  to	  warrant	  consideration	  of	  a	  strong	  policy	  response.	  Despite	  the	  concurrence	  among	  the	  aforementioned	  organizations	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  dissent	  from	  any	  professional	  scientific	  body,	  lingering	  debate	  concerning	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  scientific	  evidence	  continues	  within	  the	  general	  public	  where	  global	  warming	  has	  come	  to	  be	  regarded	  by	  many	  as	  an	  ideology.	  In	  a	  recent	  interview	  by	  Fox	  News	  shortly	  after	  the	  Copenhagen	  accord,	  Czech	  President	  Vaclav	  Klaus	  remarked,	  “I’m	  convinced	  that	  after	  years	  of	  studying	  the	  phenomena,	  global	  warming	  is	  not	  a	  real	  issue	  of	  temperature…that	  is	  the	  issue	  is	  of	  a	  new	  ideology	  or	  religion.	  A	  religion	  of	  climate	  change	  or	  a	  religion	  of	  global	  warming”	  (Koprowski,	  2009).	  Indeed,	  Klaus’	  reference	  to	  religion	  is	  an	  appropriate	  one.	  Lay	  persons	  and	  scientific	  experts,	  skeptics	  and	  believers	  alike	  often	  refer	  their	  stance	  on	  the	  issue	  much	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  one	  might	  believe	  in	  some	  moral	  code	  of	  conduct	  or	  deity.	  MIT	  atmospheric	  scientist	  Dr.	  Richard	  Lindzen	  in	  observing	  this	  phenomenon	  concluded	  that	  climate	  change	  had	  indeed	  “become	  a	  quasi-­‐religious	  issue”	  (Lindzen,	  2010).	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  extreme	  example	  of	  ideological	  faith	  in	  global	  warming	  comes	  from	  a	  UK	  court	  ruling	  where	  belief	  in	  climate	  change	  was	  granted	  the	  same	  legal	  protection	  as	  religious	  belief.	  In	  the	  landmark	  ruling	  executive	  Tim	  Nicholson	  was	  granted	  permission	  to	  sue	  his	  former	  employer	  for	  discrimination	  based	  on	  his	  “belief	  in	  man-­‐made	  climate	  change”	  as	  “a	  philosophical	  belief	  that	  reflects	  moral	  and	  ethical	  values.”	  In	  his	  opinion,	  Justice	  Michael	  Burton	  concluded,	  “a	  belief	  in	  man-­‐made	  climate	  change…is	  capable,	  if	  genuinely	  held,	  of	  being	  a	  philosophical	  belief	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  2003	  Religion	  and	  Belief	  Regulations”	  (Adams,	  2009).	  Addressing	  scientific	  theories	  and	  evidence	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  ideological	  distinction	  between	  believers	  and	  non-­‐believers	  or	  skeptics	  is	  problematic	  in	  that	  it	  creates	  a	  false	  dichotomy	  that	  misrepresents	  the	  nature	  of	  knowledge	  obtained	  using	  the	  scientific	  method,	  and	  makes	  it	  difficult	  for	  any	  objective	  assessment	  of	  the	  knowledge	  for	  policy	  purposes.	  Skeptics	  often	  view	  climate	  science	  as	  something	  of	  which	  they	  are	  entitled	  to	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their	  own	  opinions,	  while	  many	  believers—including	  policy	  advocates	  and	  climate	  scientists	  acting	  as	  policy	  advocates—view	  the	  scientific	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  the	  anthropogenic	  climate	  change	  hypothesis	  and	  predictions	  of	  catastrophic	  outcomes	  as	  indisputable.	  Although	  the	  scientific	  community	  isn’t	  entirely	  to	  blame	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  this	  dichotomy,	  many	  within	  the	  community	  are	  accountable	  for	  perpetuating	  the	  dichotomy	  by	  portraying	  the	  science	  in	  terms	  of	  indisputable	  truth	  claims	  instead	  of	  making	  the	  painstaking	  effort	  to	  educate	  the	  general	  public	  on	  the	  inherent	  scientific	  uncertainty	  and	  complexity	  of	  climate	  science.	  Perhaps	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  sway	  public	  perception,	  present	  the	  strongest	  possible	  case	  for	  policy	  intervention,	  and	  to	  counteract	  opposition	  by	  special	  interests	  in	  the	  energy	  sector	  such	  as	  large	  oil	  and	  coal	  companies	  that	  would	  stand	  to	  lose	  market	  share	  should	  any	  carbon	  mitigating	  policy	  be	  enacted,	  many	  scientists	  operating	  as	  activists	  have	  embraced	  a	  believer/skeptic	  dichotomy	  and	  have	  promoted	  the	  science	  largely	  as	  indisputable	  without	  adequately	  acknowledging	  inherent	  uncertainty	  in	  both	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  and	  theoretical	  models.	  An	  appeal	  to	  absolute	  certainty	  by	  scientist	  advocates	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  strong	  policy	  response	  is	  enticing	  for	  multiple	  reasons.	  First,	  in	  a	  media	  era	  dominated	  by	  brief	  sound	  bites	  with	  limited	  critical	  discussion,	  explaining	  the	  uncertainty	  surrounding	  climate	  science	  to	  the	  general	  public	  is	  arduous.	  Second,	  as	  much	  discussion	  of	  policy	  within	  the	  political	  establishment	  is	  framed	  in	  absolutist-­‐type	  dichotomies	  that	  fall	  along	  party	  lines,	  scientist	  activists	  may	  have	  found	  it	  easier	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  political	  establishment	  rather	  than	  take	  on	  both	  the	  false-­‐dichotomic	  structure	  of	  political	  discourse	  as	  well	  as	  presenting	  the	  scientific	  case	  for	  policy	  action.	  Third,	  scientist	  activists	  may	  have	  envisioned	  stakeholders	  who	  are	  opposed	  to	  a	  strong	  climate	  policy	  response	  portraying	  the	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  science	  as	  evidence	  that	  the	  anthropogenic	  climate	  change	  hypothesis	  is	  weak	  and	  that	  no	  policy	  action	  should	  be	  taken.	  By	  presenting	  the	  science	  as	  indisputable,	  policy	  advocates	  could	  easily	  avoid	  the	  perceived	  weakness	  in	  uncertainty.	  	  Whatever	  the	  case	  may	  be,	  the	  dichotomy	  that	  has	  emerged	  has	  resulted	  in	  both	  sides	  entrenching	  themselves	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  knowledge	  assessment	  is	  no	  longer	  relegated	  to	  the	  confines	  of	  objective	  scientific	  inquiry	  and	  has	  been	  engulfed	  by	  political	  intervention	  and	  activism	  on	  the	  part	  of	  scientists	  beyond	  simply	  doing	  science	  as	  well	  as	  policymakers	  simply	  enacting	  policy.	  Examples	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  intervention	  in	  the	  assessment	  of	  climate	  science	  are	  abundant.	  On	  the	  political	  front	  we	  see	  in	  response	  to	  the	  University	  of	  East	  Anglia	  “climategate”	  controversy	  the	  Utah	  State	  Legislature	  issuing	  a	  joint	  resolution	  of	  their	  own	  assessment	  of	  the	  science	  calling	  global	  warming	  a	  “conspiracy”	  based	  on	  “flawed”	  evidence	  and	  that	  the	  risks	  attributed	  to	  global	  warming	  are	  unfounded	  (Gibson,	  2010).	  Sensing	  a	  similar	  opportunity	  to	  respond	  to	  “climategate,”	  the	  United	  States	  Senate	  Committee	  on	  Environment	  and	  Public	  Works	  minority	  staff	  reported	  that	  the	  controversy	  “seriously	  compromise[ed]	  the	  IPCC-­‐based	  consensus	  and	  its	  central	  conclusion	  that	  anthropogenic	  emissions	  are	  inexorably	  leading	  to	  environmental	  catastrophes”	  (Dempsey,	  2010).	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  U.S.	  Senate	  we	  see	  British	  Parliament	  defending	  the	  scientists	  involved	  in	  the	  controversy	  claiming	  that	  “actions	  were	  in	  line	  with	  the	  common	  practice	  in	  the	  climate	  science	  community,”	  and	  that	  “phrases	  such	  as	  ‘trick’	  or	  ‘hiding	  the	  decline’	  were	  colloquial	  terms	  used	  in	  private	  emails	  and	  the	  balance	  of	  the	  evidence	  is	  that	  [the	  scientists	  involved]	  were	  not	  part	  of	  a	  systematic	  attempt	  to	  mislead”	  (House	  of	  Commons,	  2010).	  In	  all	  of	  this,	  what	  we	  observe	  in	  the	  actions	  of	  advocates	  and	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skeptics	  is	  precisely	  what	  is	  to	  be	  expected	  under	  an	  ideological	  believer/skeptic	  dichotomy:	  both	  sides	  responding	  to	  the	  situation	  by	  more	  firmly	  entrenching	  themselves	  in	  their	  already	  established	  views.	  Perhaps	  of	  greatest	  importance	  is	  that	  acceptance	  of	  the	  believer/skeptic	  dichotomy	  by	  some	  scientist	  activists	  has	  produced	  the	  unintended	  and	  perhaps	  unintuitive	  effect	  of	  leaving	  the	  science	  itself	  vulnerable	  to	  attacks	  by	  dissenters,	  powerful	  stakeholders,	  and	  political	  opposition.	  By	  buying	  into	  the	  illusion	  of	  having	  certain	  knowledge,	  scientist	  activists	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  inevitable	  disaster.	  They	  were	  counting	  on	  the	  science	  to	  prove	  something	  that	  the	  scientific	  method	  is	  incapable	  of	  proving:	  indisputable	  hard	  facts.	  Framing	  the	  scientific	  argument	  for	  policy	  intervention	  in	  terms	  of	  indisputable	  scientific	  truths	  claims	  and	  complete	  consensus	  within	  the	  scientific	  community	  is	  flawed	  on	  multiple	  fronts.	  First,	  science	  is	  inherently	  probabilistic	  and	  any	  attempt	  to	  hide	  the	  uncertainty	  will	  always	  backfire	  when	  the	  uncertainty	  surfaces	  and	  the	  public	  realizes	  that	  what	  they	  were	  told	  was	  indisputable	  really	  is	  not.	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  believe	  the	  statement	  made	  by	  both	  the	  heads	  of	  the	  British	  Royal	  Society	  and	  US	  National	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	  that	  “neither	  recent	  controversies,	  nor	  recent	  cold	  weather,	  negate	  the	  consensus	  among	  scientists”	  (Rees,	  2010),	  when	  just	  last	  month	  aforementioned	  MIT	  climate	  scientist	  Dr.	  Richard	  Lindzen	  gave	  expert	  testimony	  at	  a	  House	  Subcommittee	  on	  Science	  and	  Technology	  vehemently	  opposing	  the	  anthropogenic	  climate	  change	  hypothesis	  (Lindzen,	  2010).	  	  Second,	  by	  not	  acknowledging	  the	  uncertainty	  outright,	  scientist	  advocates	  allow	  for	  a	  framework	  which	  gives	  dissenters	  a	  significant	  logical	  advantage.	  More	  will	  be	  said	  on	  this	  later.	  For	  a	  prominent	  example	  of	  the	  failure	  to	  acknowledge	  scientific	  uncertainty	  in	  climate	  science	  backfiring,	  we	  return	  again	  to	  the	  “climategate”	  scandal	  at	  the	  University	  of	  East	  Anglia.	  Although	  the	  leaked	  emails	  and	  documents	  did	  little	  to	  undermine	  the	  overall	  strength	  of	  the	  scientific	  argument	  supporting	  the	  anthropogenic	  climate	  change	  hypothesis,	  the	  scandal	  shattered	  much	  progress	  that	  had	  been	  made	  with	  regards	  to	  public	  opinion.	  As	  John	  Tierney	  of	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  put	  it,	  “these	  researchers,	  some	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  climate	  experts	  in	  Britain	  and	  America,	  seemed	  so	  focused	  on	  winning	  the	  public-­‐relations	  war	  that	  they	  exaggerated	  their	  certitude—and	  ultimately	  undermined	  their	  own	  cause”	  (Tierney,	  2009).	  For	  any	  true	  progress	  to	  be	  made	  towards	  a	  strong	  policy	  response,	  scientists	  who	  decide	  to	  take	  on	  an	  advocacy	  role	  must	  do	  a	  better	  job	  framing	  the	  debate	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  complexity	  and	  uncertainty,	  but	  to	  do	  so	  will	  require	  a	  realistic	  portrayal	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  and	  just	  what	  it	  is	  that	  scientific	  inquiry	  does	  and	  does	  not	  convey.	  Much	  can	  be	  learned	  regarding	  the	  nature	  of	  climate	  science	  and	  how	  to	  properly	  frame	  the	  argument	  for	  policy	  intervention	  by	  considering	  leading	  theories	  regarding	  the	  ontology	  of	  scientific	  truth,	  and	  by	  looking	  at	  historical	  examples	  of	  knowledge	  assessment	  that	  are	  similar	  to	  current	  assessments	  of	  climate	  science.	  In	  the	  end,	  these	  considerations	  of	  the	  history	  and	  philosophy	  of	  science	  suggest	  a	  better	  portrayal	  of	  the	  evidence	  supporting	  the	  anthropogenic	  climate	  change	  hypohtesis	  not	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  affirming	  or	  refuting	  the	  hypothesis,	  but	  rather	  in	  terms	  of	  risk	  assessment	  and	  to	  consideration	  of	  how	  best	  to	  go	  about	  mitigating	  risk	  in	  light	  of	  potential	  catastrophic	  impacts	  on	  both	  the	  economy	  and	  environment.	  Framing	  the	  scientific	  argument	  in	  terms	  of	  risk	  mitigation	  accurately	  acknowledges	  the	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  science	  and	  forces	  scientist	  advocates	  and	  policy	  makers	  to	  focus	  more	  on	  emphasizing	  the	  importance	  of	  risk	  management	  and	  risk	  mitigation	  instead	  of	  fighting	  endlessly	  over	  absolute	  knowledge	  affirmation.	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II.	   Facts,	  Falsification,	  and	  Scientific	  Paradigms	  The	  arguments	  presented	  in	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  paper,	  in	  favor	  of	  greater	  public	  recognition	  of	  uncertainty	  by	  scientists	  and	  policy	  advocates,	  are	  made	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  what	  Mary	  Tiles	  and	  Hans	  Oberdiek	  identify	  in	  Living	  in	  a	  Technological	  Culture.	  They	  state:	  	   Philosophical	  reflection	  may	  be	  able	  to	  make	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  discussion	  of	  issues	  which	  have	  drawn	  the	  thoughtful	  attention	  of	  reflective	  scientists,	  engineers,	  and	  policy	  makers…one	  may	  see	  how	  to	  rethink	  and	  thereby	  begin	  to	  restructure	  a	  practice	  so	  that	  what	  troubles,	  bothers,	  and	  perplexes	  and	  sometimes	  torments	  need	  not	  arise	  in	  so	  acute	  a	  form	  (Tiles,	  1995).	  	  Consideration	  of	  the	  history	  and	  philosophy	  of	  science	  is	  helpful	  because	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  take	  a	  step	  back	  from	  the	  complex	  details	  of	  the	  situation	  at	  hand	  and	  explore	  more	  broadly	  some	  of	  the	  meta-­‐issues	  within	  which	  the	  details	  are	  confined.	  It	  allows	  us	  to	  think	  more	  broadly	  on	  how	  to	  properly	  frame	  the	  argument	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  we	  see	  the	  forest	  for	  the	  trees.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  climate	  change,	  historical	  and	  philosophic	  inquiries	  offer	  two	  unique	  perspectives.	  First,	  consideration	  of	  philosophy	  allows	  for	  thoughtful	  reflection	  on	  the	  epistemological	  justification	  of	  truth	  claims	  concerning	  climate	  change.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  truth	  claims	  are	  based	  on	  the	  scientific	  method	  which	  is	  inductive	  in	  nature	  and	  therefore	  postulating	  scientific	  truth	  claims	  as	  indisputable	  is	  epistemologically	  inconsistent;	  indisputable	  truth	  claims	  belong	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  deductive	  not	  inductive	  logic.	  Second,	  looking	  at	  historical	  perspectives	  provides	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight;	  something	  not	  afforded	  consideration	  of	  contemporary	  issues.	  By	  identifying	  and	  studying	  historically	  similar	  incidences	  we	  can	  better	  understand	  which	  factors	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  addressing	  the	  issues	  at	  hand.	  Indeed,	  much	  of	  what	  has	  troubled,	  bothered,	  perplexed,	  and	  perhaps	  tormented	  climate	  scientists	  and	  policymakers	  when	  dealing	  with	  climate	  change	  has	  arisen	  out	  of	  a	  misrepresentation,	  misunderstanding,	  or	  failure	  to	  fully	  acknowledge	  the	  nature	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  and	  how	  scientific	  “truths”	  come	  to	  be	  accepted	  by	  the	  scientific	  community.	  In	  rethinking	  and	  restructuring	  a	  proper	  representation,	  we	  consider	  three	  elements	  of	  scientific	  inquiry:	  metaphysical	  truths	  and	  scientific	  “facts,”	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  scientific	  method	  and	  falsification,	  and	  the	  history	  of	  scientific	  paradigms.	  	   A	  key	  misrepresentation	  regarding	  the	  science	  of	  climate	  change	  deals	  with	  facts.	  When	  we	  think	  of	  facts	  we	  often	  think	  of	  them	  as	  being	  what	  is	  beyond	  dispute;	  that	  the	  evidence	  supporting	  them	  is	  so	  overwhelming	  that	  it	  couldn’t	  possibly	  be	  otherwise.	  The	  problem	  however	  is	  that	  the	  scientific	  method	  by	  which	  theories	  of	  climate	  change	  are	  produced	  does	  not	  generate	  facts	  in	  this	  kind	  of	  metaphysical	  sense.	  The	  strength	  of	  scientific	  inquiry	  is	  not	  in	  the	  product	  being	  something	  that	  is	  beyond	  dispute,	  but	  rather	  that	  the	  method	  of	  formulating	  hypothesis	  and	  testing	  them	  is	  an	  objective	  one	  in	  which	  we	  place	  great	  value	  in	  the	  method	  itself.	  The	  method	  does	  not	  guarantee	  that	  the	  products	  will	  be	  irrefutable,	  but	  rather	  provides	  the	  context	  in	  which	  objective	  and	  unbiased	  critical	  reasoning	  can	  occur.	  As	  Tiles	  and	  Oberdiek	  observe,	  “if	  there	  is	  an	  association	  between	  science	  and	  facts	  it	  must	  be	  that	  scientific	  methods	  are	  regarded	  as	  being	  the	  most	  reliable	  we	  have	  available	  for	  determining	  the	  answers	  to	  questions	  we	  may	  have	  about	  the	  world.”	  (Tiles,	  1995).	  The	  reason	  why	  we	  give	  so	  much	  clout	  to	  knowledge	  obtained	  by	  the	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scientific	  method	  is	  not	  because	  it	  is	  indisputable,	  but	  rather	  because	  we	  have	  found	  the	  method	  to	  be	  the	  most	  effective	  in	  explaining	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  naturally	  observed	  phenomena	  and	  we	  expect	  claims	  obtained	  by	  the	  method	  to	  be	  superior	  to	  other	  methods	  of	  knowledge	  generation.	  Although	  we	  often	  give	  the	  products	  of	  scientific	  inquiry	  the	  designation	  of	  being	  facts,	  this	  is	  only	  superficial	  in	  that	  it	  represents	  the	  trust	  made	  in	  methods	  of	  scientific	  investigation.	  Even	  then,	  this	  status	  is	  only	  granted	  gradually	  over	  time	  as	  scientists	  become	  more	  and	  more	  confident	  in	  their	  discoveries	  and	  observations.	  Despite	  this	  confidence,	  what	  is	  often	  acknowledged	  but	  overlooked	  in	  climate	  science	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  provisional	  quality	  to	  any	  knowledge	  obtained	  using	  scientific	  inquiry	  including	  what	  we	  may	  colloquially	  refer	  to	  as	  fact.	  Present	  theories	  are	  always	  subject	  to	  subsequent	  revision	  and	  are	  often	  heavily	  revised	  in	  the	  face	  of	  new	  and	  improved	  evidence.	  While	  climate	  change	  advocates	  point	  to	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  scientific	  method	  in	  producing	  climate	  models	  and	  projections	  of	  future	  impacts	  as	  the	  most	  reliable	  for	  establishing	  knowledge,	  they	  must	  not	  fail	  to	  also	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  truth	  claims	  generated	  are	  not	  factual	  in	  an	  ontological	  sense,	  and	  that	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  scientific	  method,	  all	  truth	  claims	  are	  subject	  to	  reevaluation.	  In	  addition,	  while	  skeptics	  might	  point	  to	  the	  constant	  revisional	  process	  of	  scientific	  inquiry	  as	  evidence	  of	  faulty	  knowledge	  and	  subjectivity,	  they	  must	  remember	  that	  scientific	  inquiry	  is	  a	  time	  proven	  method	  that	  has	  been	  reliable	  again	  and	  again	  for	  explaining	  natural	  phenomena.	  The	  results	  that	  are	  produced	  by	  climate	  scientists	  are	  not	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  personal	  opinion.	  A	  second	  misunderstanding	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  climate	  science	  that	  relates	  to	  the	  logic	  of	  scientific	  inquiry	  is	  in	  recognizing	  that	  science	  does	  not	  produce	  positive	  knowledge.	  It	  is	  this	  misrepresentation	  that	  often	  leads	  to	  the	  products	  of	  scientific	  inquiry	  being	  viewed	  as	  facts	  in	  a	  metaphysical	  sense.	  If	  we	  look	  closely	  at	  the	  logic	  underlying	  the	  scientific	  method	  we	  see	  two	  distinct	  logical	  entities:	  observations	  which	  are	  existential,	  and	  theories	  which	  are	  universal.	  Observations	  have	  the	  characteristic	  of	  being	  true	  of	  a	  particular	  instance.	  We	  can	  observe	  a	  red	  rose	  in	  a	  garden,	  and	  insomuch	  as	  others	  observe	  the	  same	  thing,	  we	  can	  infer	  that	  there	  does	  exist	  a	  red	  rose	  in	  the	  garden	  for	  that	  particular	  instance.	  With	  observations	  you	  are	  only	  able	  to	  make	  truth	  claims	  that	  are	  existentially	  quantifiable.	  With	  theories	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  goal	  is	  to	  make	  some	  kind	  of	  truth	  claim	  that	  holds	  universally.	  How	  can	  we	  say	  that	  all	  the	  flowers	  in	  the	  garden	  are	  red	  without	  observing	  every	  one?	  Universal	  truth	  claims	  are	  much	  more	  powerful	  than	  existential	  claims	  because	  they	  can	  be	  made	  not	  only	  in	  reference	  to	  past	  and	  present	  observations,	  but	  also	  provide	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  projections	  regarding	  future	  observations	  as	  well.	  The	  main	  purpose	  of	  the	  scientific	  method	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  logical	  step	  in	  going	  from	  the	  
existential	  to	  the	  universal.	  This	  is	  done	  by	  presenting	  some	  sort	  of	  universal	  truth	  claim	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  hypothesis,	  and	  inasmuch	  as	  the	  observations	  used	  to	  test	  the	  hypothesis	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  expected	  outcome,	  the	  universal	  truth	  claim	  posed	  by	  the	  hypothesis	  is	  accepted	  as	  a	  true	  theory.	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  is	  that	  going	  from	  the	  existential	  to	  universal	  is	  logically	  inductive.	  If	  you	  misinterpret	  it	  as	  being	  deductive	  you	  commit	  the	  logical	  fallacy	  of	  existential	  generalization.	  One	  cannot	  deductively	  generalize	  from	  a	  collection	  of	  individual	  observations	  to	  a	  universal	  statement	  that	  holds	  true	  for	  all	  possible	  instances.	  One	  cannot	  say	  that	  just	  because	  two,	  or	  twenty,	  or	  two	  hundred,	  or	  two	  thousand	  red	  roses	  are	  observed	  in	  the	  garden	  that	  all	  roses	  in	  the	  garden	  are	  red.	  Although	  the	  observation	  of	  more	  and	  more	  red	  roses	  adds	  additional	  support	  to	  the	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universal	  statement	  that	  all	  roses	  in	  the	  garden	  are	  red,	  it	  never	  positively	  proves	  it.	  It	  is	  always	  that	  case	  that	  sometime	  in	  the	  future	  a	  white	  rose	  could	  be	  discovered.	  This	  logical	  problem	  with	  the	  scientific	  method	  has	  led	  philosophers	  of	  science	  to	  view	  theories	  obtained	  through	  scientific	  inquiry	  not	  as	  truths	  that	  have	  been	  positively	  affirmed,	  but	  rather	  as	  truths	  that	  have	  yet	  to	  be	  refuted.	  The	  term	  as	  famously	  coined	  by	  Karl	  Popper	  is	  that	  all	  scientific	  knowledge	  is	  falsifiable.	  The	  longer	  a	  scientific	  theory	  goes	  without	  being	  refuted	  the	  stronger	  the	  theory	  becomes,	  but	  the	  absence	  of	  refutation	  never	  constitutes	  positive	  affirmation.	  It	  is	  always	  possible	  that	  some	  future	  observation	  could	  overturn	  what	  is	  collectively	  accepted	  as	  indisputable	  by	  the	  scientific	  community	  today.	  Recognition	  of	  the	  logic	  of	  scientific	  inquiry	  and	  falsifiability	  demonstrates	  why	  framing	  climate	  science	  as	  indisputable	  gives	  dissenters	  an	  upper	  hand.	  If	  you	  properly	  frame	  the	  science	  of	  climate	  change	  in	  terms	  of	  inductive	  reasoning	  and	  uncertainty	  your	  argument	  may	  not	  carry	  the	  strength	  of	  something	  that	  is	  absolute,	  but	  it	  can	  still	  remain	  strong	  and	  compelling.	  When	  framed	  inductively,	  a	  single	  piece	  of	  evidence	  contrary	  to	  the	  anthropogenic	  climate	  change	  hypothesis	  does	  not	  seriously	  threaten	  the	  overall	  position;	  you	  can	  still	  point	  to	  all	  the	  other	  evidence	  in	  your	  favor.	  If	  I	  say,	  after	  observing	  20,000	  red	  roses	  there	  is	  strong	  reason	  to	  believe	  most	  all	  roses	  in	  the	  garden	  are	  red,	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  single	  white	  rose	  presented	  by	  someone	  dissenting	  from	  my	  position	  doesn’t	  repudiate	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  still	  are	  20,000	  red	  roses.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  by	  ascribing	  to	  the	  theory	  of	  climate	  change	  the	  property	  of	  indisputability,	  as	  if	  it	  had	  been	  derived	  deductively,	  a	  single	  piece	  of	  evidence	  contrary	  to	  the	  theory	  does	  undermine	  the	  entire	  position.	  This	  is	  based	  on	  what	  is	  called	  argument	  by	  refutation,	  or	  what	  philosophers	  and	  logicians	  refer	  to	  as	  reductio	  ad	  absurdum.	  If	  scientist	  advocates	  claim	  emphatically	  there	  is	  complete	  consensus	  among	  the	  scientific	  community	  and	  that	  the	  science	  is	  settled,	  even	  one	  dissenter	  or	  one	  study	  that	  is	  later	  overturned	  reveals	  to	  the	  public	  non-­‐consensus	  and	  inconsistency;	  the	  presence	  of	  one	  dissenting	  scientist,	  such	  as	  Dr.	  Lindzen	  giving	  testimony	  before	  the	  House	  Subcommittee,	  is	  enough	  to	  bring	  the	  entire	  tower	  of	  cards	  crashing	  down.	  Just	  one	  white	  rose	  in	  a	  garden	  of	  red	  roses	  is	  enough	  to	  overturn	  the	  assertion	  that	  all	  roses	  in	  the	  garden	  are	  red.	  The	  final,	  and	  perhaps	  most	  crucial	  concept	  that	  is	  often	  overlooked	  concerning	  climate	  change	  science	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  science	  has	  historically	  progressed	  through	  a	  series	  of	  scientific	  paradigms	  where	  a	  certain	  worldview	  and	  set	  of	  scientific	  theories	  dominate	  for	  a	  given	  period	  of	  time,	  but	  are	  later	  replaced	  as	  old	  theories	  are	  refuted	  and	  new	  theories	  are	  made	  in	  their	  place.	  This	  happens	  with	  theories	  being	  deconstructed	  in	  the	  face	  of	  phenomena	  they	  can’t	  explain,	  after	  which	  new	  theories	  are	  reconstructed	  so	  as	  to	  explain	  both	  past	  observations	  and	  the	  phenomena	  which	  led	  to	  the	  deconstruction	  of	  the	  old	  theories	  to	  begin	  with.	  This	  view	  of	  science	  is	  most	  famously	  advocated	  in	  The	  Structure	  
of	  Scientific	  Revolutions	  by	  Thomas	  Kuhn.	  By	  acknowledging	  the	  nature	  of	  changing	  scientific	  paradigms,	  members	  of	  the	  climate	  science	  community	  should	  realize	  that	  scientific	  consensus	  is	  a	  rare	  thing	  and	  that	  science	  has	  evolved	  prominently	  as	  a	  result	  of,	  not	  despite,	  competing	  scientific	  theories.	  While	  paradigm	  shifts	  are	  often	  small	  in	  their	  scope	  and	  confined	  within	  disciplines,	  they	  can	  also	  be	  expansive	  and	  transcend	  what	  has	  long	  been	  accepted	  without	  opposition.	  By	  looking	  at	  the	  history	  of	  science	  we	  see	  that	  cycles	  of	  evolving	  scientific	  paradigms	  is	  the	  rule,	  not	  the	  exception.	  Beginning	  with	  the	  early	  Greeks	  many	  theories	  were	  postulated	  regarding	  the	  fundamental	  nature	  of	  matter;	  Thales	  said	  everything	  was	  made	  of	  water,	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Anaximenes	  said	  everything	  was	  air,	  Heraclitus	  said	  all	  was	  fire,	  while	  finally	  around	  350	  B.C.	  Aristotle	  claimed	  that	  everything	  consisted	  of	  air,	  fire,	  water,	  and	  earth	  (Baird,	  Ancient	  Philosophy,	  2003).	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  proceeding	  centuries,	  Aristotle’s	  theory	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  matter	  along	  with	  his	  other	  scientific	  theories	  on	  causation,	  logic,	  and	  astronomy	  were	  more	  widely	  accepted.	  By	  the	  1st	  century,	  most	  of	  Western	  and	  Islamic	  science	  had	  incorporated	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  Aristotelian	  scientific	  paradigm	  with	  some	  additional	  influence	  from	  other	  notable	  thinkers	  such	  as	  Ptolomy	  and	  Galen	  (Gutas,	  1998).	  Gradually	  as	  centuries	  passed,	  challenges	  to	  the	  Aristotelian	  paradigm	  arose	  and	  more	  and	  more	  phenomena	  were	  observed	  that	  the	  Aristotelian	  paradigm	  was	  incapable	  of	  explaining.	  Where	  Aristotle	  claimed	  that	  the	  earth	  was	  the	  center	  of	  the	  universe,	  Copernicus	  argued	  circa	  1500	  A.D.	  it	  was	  the	  sun.	  Where	  Aristotle	  claimed	  that	  everything	  in	  the	  heavens	  was	  made	  of	  a	  perfect	  celestial	  matter,	  Galileo—with	  the	  use	  of	  the	  then	  newly	  invented	  telescope	  circa	  1600	  A.D.—observed	  mountains	  and	  craters	  and	  other	  imperfections	  on	  the	  moon	  (DeWitt,	  2004).	  Where	  Aristotle	  claimed	  that	  the	  universe	  was	  finite,	  many	  astronomers	  began	  to	  suspect	  while	  gazing	  into	  the	  heavens	  that	  the	  universe	  may	  actually	  be	  infinite.	  What	  we	  see	  in	  all	  of	  these	  examples	  is	  a	  growing	  deconstruction	  of	  the	  Aristotelian	  paradigm	  as	  more	  and	  more	  phenomena	  were	  observed	  that	  the	  paradigm	  was	  incapable	  of	  explaining.	  Although	  there	  were	  various	  individuals	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  a	  new	  scientific	  paradigm	  after	  the	  deconstruction	  of	  the	  Aristotelian	  worldview,	  we	  give	  most	  of	  the	  credit	  to	  Sir	  Isaac	  Newton.	  What	  we	  find	  in	  Newton’s	  Principia	  and	  the	  three	  laws	  of	  motion	  is	  exactly	  what	  is	  to	  be	  expected	  under	  Kuhn’s	  view:	  a	  new	  set	  of	  laws	  and	  theories	  that	  collectively	  explain	  past	  observations,	  but	  that	  also	  explain	  the	  phenomena	  that	  led	  to	  the	  deconstruction	  of	  the	  Aristotelian	  paradigm	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  In	  comparison	  to	  Aristotle,	  however,	  the	  success	  of	  the	  Newtonian	  paradigm	  was	  short	  lived	  as	  Newtonian	  theories	  are	  found	  in	  the	  late	  1800s	  to	  predict	  behavior	  contrary	  to	  what	  was	  experimentally	  observed.	  In	  particular,	  the	  ultraviolet	  spectrum	  of	  blackbody	  radiation,	  the	  monoenergetic	  nature	  of	  light	  coming	  from	  heated	  elements,	  and	  the	  properties	  of	  radioactivity	  were	  all	  unexplainable	  under	  the	  Newtonian	  paradigm	  (DeWitt,	  2004).	  As	  Kuhn	  would	  expect,	  we	  see	  a	  subsequent	  deconstruction	  of	  the	  Newtonian	  worldview	  and	  a	  reconstruction	  of	  a	  scientific	  paradigm	  with	  the	  addition	  of	  Einstein’s	  special	  relativity	  and	  quantum	  theory	  as	  advanced	  by	  Schrödinger,	  Bohr,	  Planck,	  Heisenberg	  and	  others.	  But	  even	  among	  these	  physicists	  there	  was	  still	  a	  lack	  of	  consensus.	  The	  most	  notable	  example	  comes	  from	  Einstein’s	  objection	  to	  uncertainty	  in	  quantum	  mechanics	  when	  he	  emphatically	  claimed,	  largely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  ideological	  religious	  views,	  that	  “God	  does	  not	  play	  dice	  with	  the	  universe”	  (Born,	  1971).	  As	  much	  as	  we	  revere	  Einstein	  for	  his	  unprecedented	  insights	  regarding	  special	  relativity,	  even	  he	  couldn’t	  fully	  separate	  ideology	  from	  scientific	  inquiry	  and	  could	  not	  have	  been	  more	  wrong	  when	  it	  came	  to	  quantum	  mechanics.	  While	  today	  we	  largely	  live	  and	  operate	  in	  the	  paradigm	  of	  special	  relativity	  and	  quantum	  theory,	  new	  developments	  in	  sub	  atomic	  particle	  physics	  are	  once	  again	  challenging	  conventional	  scientific	  understanding	  and	  if	  history	  has	  a	  way	  of	  repeating	  itself,	  it	  is	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  time	  before	  our	  own	  current	  paradigm	  is	  the	  victim	  of	  yet	  additional	  unexplainable	  phenomena	  and	  is	  laid	  to	  rest	  in	  the	  ever	  growing	  graveyard	  of	  failed	  scientific	  theories.	  From	  Kuhn’s	  historical	  portrayal	  of	  science	  as	  a	  history	  of	  scientific	  paradigms,	  we	  gain	  two	  important	  insights	  into	  the	  science	  of	  climate	  change.	  First,	  we	  learn	  that	  “if	  both	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observation	  and	  conceptualization,	  fact	  and	  assimilation	  to	  theory,	  are	  inseparably	  linked	  in	  discovery,	  then	  discovery	  is	  a	  process	  and	  must	  take	  time”	  (Kuhn,	  1996).	  By	  this	  Kuhn	  is	  linking	  what	  was	  discussed	  previously	  regarding	  falsification	  and	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  scientific	  method	  with	  history.	  If	  in	  doing	  science	  we	  are	  logically	  going	  from	  the	  existential	  (or	  what	  Kuhn	  calls	  observations	  or	  facts)	  to	  the	  universal	  (what	  Kuhn	  calls	  conceptualization	  or	  theory),	  then	  discovery	  which	  is	  dependent	  on	  empirical	  observations	  can	  happen	  no	  faster	  than	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  empirical	  observations	  are	  made	  in	  support	  of	  universal	  theories.	  The	  lesson	  to	  be	  learned	  is	  that	  even	  short	  term	  scientific	  consensus	  takes	  time	  to	  develop	  and	  we	  cannot	  expect	  science	  to	  deliver	  concrete	  results	  overnight.	  Despite	  all	  that	  current	  science	  on	  climate	  change	  tells	  us,	  there	  still	  remain	  significant	  uncertainties	  which	  will	  only	  be	  resolved	  over	  the	  course	  of	  time.	  This	  presents	  a	  significant	  challenge	  to	  policymakers	  because	  if	  consensus	  and	  reduction	  of	  uncertainty	  takes	  time,	  and	  if	  action	  is	  required	  now	  to	  mitigate	  catastrophic	  effects	  of	  climate	  change	  later,	  then	  policymakers	  will	  have	  to	  make	  key	  decisions	  concerning	  policy	  response	  with	  uncertain,	  incomplete,	  and	  imperfect	  information.	  	  The	  second	  lesson	  we	  learn	  is	  that	  “history	  suggests	  that	  the	  road	  to	  a	  firm	  research	  consensus	  is	  extraordinarily	  arduous”	  (Kuhn,	  1996).	  This	  is	  largely	  because	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  strong	  and	  compelling	  evidence,	  dissenters	  play	  a	  necessary	  role	  in	  providing	  critical	  assessment	  of	  popular	  theories.	  When	  dissent	  is	  acknowledged,	  it	  forces	  proponents	  of	  the	  anthropogenic	  climate	  change	  hypothesis	  to	  develop	  even	  stronger	  scientific	  evidence	  and	  to	  look	  for	  additional	  ways	  of	  reducing	  the	  scientific	  uncertainty.	  In	  this	  context	  
acknowledging	  and	  responding	  to	  the	  dissenters	  by	  generating	  stronger	  evidence	  and	  reducing	  uncertainty	  actually	  ends	  up	  strengthening	  the	  scientific	  argument	  for	  policy	  intervention	  instead	  of	  weakening	  it.	  This	  runs	  contrary	  to	  how	  many	  scientist	  advocates	  are	  trying	  to	  deal	  with	  dissenters.	  As	  Kuhn’s	  history	  of	  scientific	  paradigms	  has	  shown,	  non-­‐consensus	  at	  the	  beginning	  leads	  to	  stronger	  and	  more	  powerful	  theories	  in	  the	  end,	  not	  weaker	  ones.	  
III.	  Uncertainty	  and	  Stakeholders:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  Copernican	  Revolution	  A	  good	  way	  to	  illustrate	  the	  philosophical	  contribution	  that	  facts,	  falsification,	  and	  scientific	  paradigms	  play	  in	  properly	  framing	  the	  assessment	  of	  climate	  science	  and	  arguments	  for	  policy	  intervention	  is	  by	  contrasting	  knowledge	  assessment	  of	  climate	  change	  with	  the	  historical	  example	  of	  the	  Copernican	  Revolution.	  In	  this	  example	  we	  see	  all	  the	  elements	  we	  have	  discussed	  thus	  far	  at	  work	  as	  we	  shift	  from	  a	  geocentric	  to	  heliocentric	  model	  of	  the	  universe	  and	  from	  circular	  to	  elliptical	  orbits.	  We	  look	  at	  knowledge	  assessment	  in	  the	  Copernican	  Revolution	  because	  it	  is	  similar	  to	  knowledge	  assessment	  of	  climate	  change	  in	  multiple	  ways;	  in	  both	  we	  see	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  science	  in	  how	  to	  theoretically	  model	  a	  natural	  system,	  and	  we	  see	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  observations	  and	  data	  supporting	  the	  theories.	  We	  also	  see	  the	  presence	  of	  large	  influential	  and	  powerfully	  entrenched	  interests	  with	  much	  riding	  on	  the	  scientific	  outcome.	  Although	  the	  Copernican	  Revolution	  officially	  commenced	  in	  1543	  with	  the	  publication	  of	  On	  the	  Revolutions	  of	  the	  Heavenly	  Spheres	  by	  Nicholas	  Copernicus,	  the	  true	  beginning	  stems	  from	  Aristotle’s	  concept	  of	  the	  universe	  as	  portrayed	  in	  On	  the	  Heavens.	  According	  to	  Aristotelian	  astronomy	  the	  earth	  is	  a	  stationary	  sphere	  sitting	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  universe.	  All	  other	  heavenly	  bodies	  such	  as	  the	  sun,	  moon,	  stars,	  and	  planets	  are	  made	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of	  perfect	  matter	  and	  reside	  in	  multiple	  levels	  of	  concentric	  spheres	  surrounding	  the	  earth	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  an	  onion	  consists	  of	  multiple	  layers.	  Aristotle	  viewed	  the	  heavens	  as	  a	  place	  of	  perfection	  and	  this	  view	  influenced	  his	  characterization	  of	  the	  motion	  of	  heavenly	  bodies	  in	  two	  ways.	  First,	  he	  viewed	  the	  circle	  as	  being	  the	  perfect	  geometric	  shape	  and	  concluded	  that	  all	  heavenly	  bodies	  must	  follow	  perfect	  circular	  orbits.	  Second,	  he	  thought	  that	  for	  something	  to	  be	  perfect	  it	  must	  also	  be	  unchangeable	  and	  concluded	  that	  if	  the	  heavens	  were	  a	  place	  of	  perfection,	  then	  all	  heavenly	  motion	  must	  be	  uniform	  and	  constant.	  	  The	  first	  major	  addition	  to	  Aristotelian	  astronomy	  was	  made	  around	  150	  A.D.	  by	  Ptolemy,	  a	  Roman	  mathematician	  and	  astronomer	  living	  in	  Alexandria.	  In	  his	  treatise	  the	  
Almagest,	  Ptolemy	  takes	  all	  the	  fundamental	  tenets	  of	  Aristotelian	  astronomy—a	  geocentric	  universe	  with	  perfect	  circular	  uniform	  motion	  of	  the	  heavenly	  bodies—and	  uses	  them	  as	  premises	  to	  derive	  a	  complex	  mathematical	  model	  of	  the	  universe.	  In	  doing	  this,	  Ptolemy	  finds	  it	  difficult	  to	  account	  for	  the	  motion	  of	  Mars	  and	  Venus	  and	  introduces	  a	  number	  of	  complex	  geometrical	  modifications	  to	  the	  system	  including	  epicycles,	  deferents,	  eccentrics,	  and	  equant	  points	  (knowledge	  of	  the	  details	  of	  these	  geometric	  tools	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  the	  current	  discussion).	  Although	  these	  modifications	  did	  not	  resolve	  all	  the	  discrepancies	  with	  observation,	  they	  greatly	  improved	  the	  model	  and	  were	  generally	  seen	  as	  being	  on	  the	  right	  track.	  These	  modifications	  left	  Aristotle’s	  fundamental	  premises	  intact,	  but	  did	  so	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  increased	  complexity.	  The	  most	  difficult	  observation	  for	  the	  model	  to	  explain	  was	  the	  retrograde	  motion	  of	  the	  planets	  as	  they	  appeared	  at	  times	  to	  be	  moving	  forward	  in	  their	  orbits	  and	  then	  stop,	  backtrack	  a	  short	  distance,	  and	  then	  resume	  moving	  in	  the	  original	  direction.	  The	  model	  presented	  by	  Ptolemy	  in	  the	  Almagest	  was	  widely	  accepted	  and	  remained	  virtually	  unchanged	  for	  roughly	  1400	  years	  until	  Copernicus’	  introduction	  of	  the	  heliocentric	  model	  (DeWitt,	  2004).	  Although	  Copernicus	  is	  often	  viewed	  as	  a	  revolutionizing	  western	  thinker	  by	  shifting	  us	  from	  a	  geocentric	  to	  heliocentric	  worldview,	  his	  motives	  were	  primarily	  to	  simplify	  some	  of	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  Ptolemaic	  model.	  Other	  than	  the	  geocentric/heliocentric	  change,	  there	  is	  otherwise	  little	  difference	  between	  the	  models	  of	  Ptolemy	  and	  Copernicus.	  As	  a	  technical	  matter,	  the	  only	  real	  advantage	  of	  the	  Copernican	  model	  was	  its	  ability	  to	  explain	  the	  retrograde	  motion	  of	  the	  planets	  without	  the	  use	  of	  epicycles.	  What	  is	  most	  interesting	  in	  the	  context	  of	  entrenched	  stakeholders	  influencing	  scientific	  outcomes	  is	  that	  although	  Copernicus	  had	  established	  much	  of	  his	  model	  of	  a	  heliocentric	  universe	  early	  in	  his	  life,	  he	  was	  hesitant	  to	  disseminate	  it	  out	  of	  fear	  of	  retribution	  from	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  and	  it	  wasn’t	  until	  his	  death	  in	  1543	  that	  On	  
the	  Revolutions	  of	  the	  Celestial	  Spheres	  was	  first	  published.	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  curtail	  the	  Church’s	  response	  and	  avoid	  possible	  punishment,	  he	  even	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  dedicate	  the	  entire	  work	  to	  Pope	  Paul	  III.	  The	  reason	  for	  the	  Church’s	  rejection	  of	  the	  heliocentric	  model	  stems	  largely	  from	  the	  fusing	  of	  Aristotelian	  science	  with	  Christian	  theology	  by	  St.	  Thomas	  Aquinas.	  Aquinas	  was	  a	  Dominican	  monk	  that	  lived	  from	  1225-­‐1274	  A.D.,	  and	  his	  primary	  interest	  was	  in	  overcoming	  disputations	  between	  philosophy	  and	  religion.	  Aquinas	  thought	  that	  there	  were	  no	  natural	  conflicts	  between	  philosophy	  and	  Christian	  theology	  and	  set	  out	  to	  prove	  that	  reason	  was	  capable	  of	  deriving	  religious	  truth.	  To	  do	  this,	  Aquinas	  accepted	  Aristotelian	  categorical	  logic	  and	  science	  and	  in	  Suma	  Theologica	  used	  both	  to	  derive	  a	  rational	  justification	  for	  every	  point	  of	  Christian	  doctrine	  (Baird,	  2003).	  Although	  Suma	  
Theologica	  and	  other	  teachings	  were	  initially	  condemned	  by	  the	  Church,	  the	  condemnation	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was	  short	  lived	  and	  Aquinas	  was	  canonized	  in	  1323	  A.D..	  Over	  the	  subsequent	  years,	  much	  of	  Aquinas’	  theology	  came	  to	  be	  accepted	  as	  the	  official	  stance	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  on	  many	  points	  of	  doctrine.	  This	  however	  created	  an	  intricate	  problem.	  Because	  Aquinas	  had	  premised	  much	  of	  his	  rational	  justification	  for	  tenets	  of	  Christian	  doctrine	  on	  Aristotelian	  science	  and	  philosophy,	  and	  because	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  had	  accepted	  Aquinas’	  theology	  as	  its	  official	  stance	  on	  many	  points	  of	  doctrine,	  any	  refutation	  of	  Aristotelian	  science	  was	  viewed	  as	  a	  direct	  challenge	  to	  the	  official	  doctrine	  of	  the	  Church.	  We	  see	  in	  works	  such	  as	  Dante’s	  Divine	  Comedy,	  the	  Aristotelian	  model	  of	  the	  cosmos	  permeating	  Christian	  doctrine	  so	  that	  by	  the	  time	  Copernicus	  came	  along	  the	  Church	  was	  highly	  entrenched	  in	  a	  geocentric	  worldview	  and	  had	  insurmountable	  incentive	  to	  maintain	  what	  was	  consistent	  with	  official	  Church	  dogma.	  What	  we	  see	  in	  this	  piece	  of	  the	  historical	  example	  is	  similar—although	  not	  entirely	  analogous—to	  the	  contemporary	  situation	  with	  climate	  change.	  Much	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  was	  dependent	  on	  perpetuating	  the	  geocentric	  worldview	  to	  maintain	  official	  dogma	  and	  thus	  tried	  to	  delegitimize	  Copernicus’	  heliocentric	  theory;	  petroleum	  and	  coal	  companies	  heavily	  invested	  in	  hydrocarbon	  fuels	  that	  emit	  carbon	  dioxide	  are	  dependent	  on	  a	  world	  where	  carbon	  emissions	  are	  admissible	  and	  therefore	  have	  strong	  incentive	  to	  delegitimize	  scientific	  evidence	  supporting	  the	  anthropogenic	  climate	  change	  hypothesis.	  One	  example	  of	  exactly	  this	  kind	  of	  behavior	  is	  Exxon	  Mobil	  which	  has	  spent	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  dollars	  funding	  lobbying	  groups	  to	  publish	  blatantly	  misleading	  and	  inaccurate	  information	  concerning	  climate	  science	  (Adam,	  2009).	  Scientist	  advocating	  for	  a	  policy	  response	  to	  climate	  change	  may	  think	  that	  knowledge	  affirmation	  is	  the	  preferred	  way	  of	  framing	  the	  debate	  because	  of	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  scientific	  evidence,	  but	  the	  Copernican	  Revolution	  shows	  that	  pursuing	  an	  argument	  based	  on	  knowledge	  affirmation	  alone	  when	  confronted	  by	  entrenched	  interests	  is	  an	  arduous	  one	  and	  can	  take	  significant	  time.	  In	  the	  Copernican	  case	  it	  wasn’t	  until	  1822—almost	  300	  years	  after	  the	  initial	  printing	  of	  On	  the	  Revolutions	  of	  the	  Heavenly	  Spheres—that	  Pope	  Pius	  VII	  allowed	  books	  adhering	  to	  the	  heliocentric	  view	  to	  be	  printed	  in	  Rome.	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  this	  is	  problematic	  because	  if	  catastrophic	  climate	  change	  is	  dependent	  on	  aggressive	  policy	  intervention	  now,	  we	  cannot	  wait	  for	  issues	  of	  knowledge	  affirmation	  to	  sort	  themselves	  out.	  Advocates	  for	  policy	  intervention	  therefore	  must	  look	  to	  some	  other	  means	  of	  
framing	  the	  science	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  call	  to	  action.	  In	  continuing	  the	  historical	  dialogue,	  sometime	  after	  Copernicus	  a	  third	  model	  was	  developed	  by	  Tycho	  Brahe	  around	  1600	  A.D.	  that	  tried	  to	  blend	  the	  Ptolemaic	  and	  Copernican	  models	  while	  retaining	  the	  perfect	  circle	  and	  constant	  motion	  facts	  of	  Aristotelian	  astronomy.	  In	  his	  model,	  Brahe	  stuck	  with	  the	  Ptolemaic	  view	  by	  having	  the	  earth	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  universe	  with	  the	  sun	  and	  moon	  revolving	  around	  the	  earth,	  but	  then	  adopted	  the	  Copernican	  view	  by	  having	  the	  planets	  orbiting	  the	  sun.	  What	  is	  telling	  is	  that	  despite	  the	  significant	  differences	  among	  the	  underlying	  theories	  of	  Ptolemy,	  Copernicus,	  and	  Brahe,	  all	  three	  models	  were	  mathematically	  identical	  and	  predicted	  the	  exact	  same	  phenomena.	  As	  Kuhn	  observes,	  “philosophers	  of	  science	  have	  repeatedly	  demonstrated	  that	  more	  than	  one	  theoretical	  construction	  can	  always	  be	  placed	  upon	  a	  given	  collection	  of	  data”	  (Kuhn,	  1996).	  In	  the	  end,	  all	  three	  models	  essentially	  described	  the	  same	  motion	  using	  different	  underlying	  premises,	  but	  none	  were	  able	  to	  completely	  overcome	  some	  of	  the	  discrepancies	  observed	  in	  the	  motion	  of	  the	  planets.	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Shortly	  after	  Tyco	  Brahe	  we	  see	  yet	  a	  fourth	  model	  proposed	  by	  German	  mathematician	  and	  astronomer	  Johannes	  Kepler	  and	  it	  is	  with	  Kepler,	  not	  Copernicus,	  that	  the	  fundamental	  breakthrough	  occurs.	  In	  constructing	  his	  model,	  Kepler	  was	  aided	  by	  two	  things.	  First,	  Kepler	  concluded	  on	  the	  onset	  that	  no	  model	  based	  on	  the	  two	  Aristotelian	  “facts”	  of	  perfect	  circular	  motion	  and	  constant	  uniform	  motion	  were	  capable	  of	  fully	  explaining	  the	  orbit	  of	  Mars.	  Second,	  as	  an	  assistant	  to	  Brahe,	  Kepler	  had	  access	  to	  arguably	  the	  best	  astronomical	  data	  of	  the	  time.	  After	  dismissing	  what	  had	  been	  generally	  accepted	  as	  indisputable	  truth	  and	  “facts,”	  Kepler	  went	  about	  experimenting	  mathematically	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  shapes	  and	  speeds	  of	  orbits,	  seeing	  what	  best	  matched	  the	  data,	  until	  he	  finally	  settled	  on	  a	  heliocentric	  universe	  with	  the	  planets	  revolving	  in	  elliptical	  orbits	  at	  varying	  speeds.	  By	  rejecting	  the	  “facts”	  Kepler	  was	  able	  to	  accomplish	  what	  Ptolemy,	  Copernicus,	  and	  Brahe	  hadn’t	  which	  was	  a	  theoretical	  description	  of	  heavenly	  motion	  that	  was	  completely	  consistent	  with	  observations	  and	  did	  so	  without	  the	  use	  of	  epicycles,	  deferents,	  eccentrics,	  or	  equant	  points.	  	  At	  this	  point	  we	  see	  the	  arguments	  addressing	  facts,	  falsifiability	  and	  scientific	  paradigms	  coming	  full	  circle.	  In	  both	  the	  climate	  change	  and	  Copernican	  Revolution	  cases	  we	  see	  scientists	  trying	  to	  explain	  natural	  phenomena	  by	  constructing	  scientific	  models.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Copernican	  revolution	  the	  main	  challenge	  to	  constructing	  the	  models	  was	  overcoming	  the	  lock-­‐in	  that	  had	  occurred	  when	  the	  Aristotelian	  “facts”	  of	  perfect	  circular	  motion	  and	  constant	  uniform	  motion	  were	  viewed	  metaphysically	  as	  absolute	  truths.	  It	  was	  only	  when	  there	  was	  an	  environment	  of	  non-­‐consensus	  where	  these	  “facts”	  were	  challenged	  that	  the	  science	  was	  finally	  able	  to	  progress.	  Had	  early	  astronomers	  understood	  falsification	  and	  the	  logic	  behind	  scientific	  “truth”	  they	  may	  have	  started	  much	  earlier	  to	  challenge	  Aristotelian	  science	  and	  look	  for	  alternative	  orbit	  shapes	  as	  Kepler	  did	  eventually.	  Had	  they	  done	  so,	  the	  may	  have	  arrived	  at	  a	  consistent	  theory	  much	  sooner.	  This	  is	  further	  evidence	  that	  science	  evolves	  as	  a	  result	  of,	  not	  despite,	  competing	  scientific	  theories,	  and	  scientist	  activists	  should	  welcome	  dissenting	  views	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  strengthen,	  not	  weaken,	  their	  position	  by	  acknowledging	  and	  responding	  to	  dissenters	  through	  the	  generation	  of	  stronger	  scientific	  evidence.	  This	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  important	  as	  climate	  scientists	  continue	  the	  challenging	  but	  crucial	  task	  of	  improving	  climate	  models	  through	  greater	  understanding	  of	  current	  areas	  of	  uncertainty	  such	  as	  water	  vapor	  feedback.	  If	  anything,	  reflection	  on	  the	  Copernican	  Revolution	  shows	  us	  that	  the	  process	  of	  doing	  science	  itself	  is	  complex	  with	  varying	  degrees	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  the	  results	  are	  not	  something	  which	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  ideologically	  in	  a	  believer/skeptic	  dichotomy.	  Knowledge	  gained	  by	  scientific	  inquiry	  does	  not	  constitute	  facts	  in	  a	  metaphysical	  sense	  and	  is	  logically	  bound	  by	  the	  principle	  of	  falsifiability.	  We	  also	  see	  in	  the	  example	  of	  the	  Copernican	  Revolution	  that	  models	  of	  nature	  with	  different	  underlying	  assumptions	  are	  capable	  of	  explaining	  the	  same	  phenomena	  and	  our	  perception	  of	  which	  models	  we	  think	  are	  best	  is	  largely	  a	  function	  of	  where	  we	  sit	  in	  the	  historical	  scheme	  of	  things.	  In	  our	  case	  looking	  back	  we	  can	  see	  only	  in	  hindsight	  what	  the	  critical	  issues	  were	  in	  developing	  a	  proper	  model	  of	  the	  cosmos	  and	  it	  is	  only	  in	  hindsight	  that	  we	  can	  see	  where	  the	  real	  progress	  was	  made.	  With	  the	  current	  assessment	  of	  climate	  science	  we	  are	  not	  afforded	  the	  luxury	  of	  hindsight.	  Whether	  in	  a	  developmental	  state	  our	  current	  climate	  models	  are	  analogous	  to	  Aristotle’s,	  Ptolemy’s,	  Copernicus’,	  or	  Kepler’s	  models	  of	  the	  cosmos,	  only	  future	  climate	  scientists	  will	  be	  able	  to	  say.	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IV.	  Knowledge	  Affirmation	  vs.	  Risk	  Mitigation	  As	  evident	  by	  the	  recent	  decline	  in	  public	  opinion	  regarding	  the	  anthropogenic	  climate	  change	  hypothesis,	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  framing	  of	  science	  in	  terms	  of	  indisputable	  truth	  claims	  and	  knowledge	  affirmation	  is	  not	  succeeding	  in	  calling	  for	  policy	  intervention.	  From	  the	  arguments	  that	  have	  been	  presented	  we	  have	  seen	  multiple	  explanations	  for	  why	  this	  is	  so:	  claiming	  consensus	  among	  scientists	  appears	  dubious	  when	  dissenting	  scientists	  are	  publically	  recognized;	  claiming	  climate	  science	  is	  indisputable	  is	  logically	  invalid	  as	  all	  scientific	  truth	  claims	  are	  falsifiable,	  there	  are	  no	  facts;	  truth	  claims	  based	  on	  the	  scientific	  method	  are	  inductive	  in	  nature	  and	  therefore	  postulating	  truth	  claims	  as	  indisputable	  is	  epistemologically	  inconsistent	  and	  vulnerable	  to	  backfire—e.g.	  “climategate”;	  pursuing	  an	  argument	  based	  on	  knowledge	  affirmation	  when	  confronted	  by	  powerfully	  entrenched	  interests	  is	  an	  arduous	  one	  and	  can	  take	  significant	  time	  to	  overcome,	  something	  that	  is	  unacceptable	  if	  policy	  action	  to	  mitigate	  future	  potential	  catastrophic	  events	  is	  needed	  now;	  scientific	  consensus	  is	  a	  rare	  thing	  and	  science	  has	  evolved	  largely	  as	  a	  result	  of,	  not	  despite,	  competing	  scientific	  theories,	  scientist	  advocates	  strengthen,	  not	  weaken	  their	  argument	  when	  they	  acknowledge	  and	  respond	  to	  dissenters;	  and	  finally,	  despite	  the	  strength	  of	  current	  science	  in	  support	  of	  the	  anthropogenic	  climate	  change	  hypothesis,	  there	  still	  remain	  significant	  uncertainties	  that	  must	  be	  overcome.	  Overall,	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  arguments	  presented	  illustrates	  the	  futility	  of	  trying	  to	  frame	  the	  argument	  for	  policy	  intervention	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  indisputable	  scientific	  facts	  and	  certain	  catastrophic	  outcomes.	  	   It	  is	  because	  climate	  change	  deals	  with	  science	  of	  such	  complexity	  and	  uncertainty	  that	  advocates	  calling	  for	  policy	  intervention	  cannot	  simply	  buy	  into	  the	  believer/skeptic	  dichotomy	  and	  expect	  to	  make	  any	  head	  way;	  advocates	  for	  policy	  intervention	  must	  look	  to	  other	  means	  of	  framing	  the	  science	  to	  legitimize	  a	  call	  for	  action.	  The	  uncertainty	  and	  complexity	  of	  the	  science	  deserves	  our	  attention	  because	  if	  there	  is	  any	  possibility	  of	  catastrophic	  consequences	  due	  to	  climate	  change,	  then	  responding	  to	  those	  future	  calamities	  must	  be	  begin	  today.	  One	  way	  that	  finality	  could	  be	  brought	  to	  the	  issue	  is	  by	  reframing	  the	  debate	  not	  in	  terms	  of	  strict	  scientific	  affirmation	  and	  indisputable	  evidence,	  but	  by	  embracing	  the	  uncertainty	  inherent	  in	  the	  science	  when	  addressing	  the	  general	  public	  and	  media	  and	  using	  that	  to	  promote	  policy	  action	  in	  terms	  of	  risk	  mitigation.	  	   An	  accurate	  account	  of	  a	  risk	  mitigation	  framing	  of	  climate	  science	  is	  given	  by	  Dr.	  Mort	  Webster	  of	  MIT.	  In	  his	  paper	  Uncertainty	  Analysis	  of	  Climate	  Change	  and	  Policy	  
Response,	  Webster	  states	  “while	  continued	  basic	  research	  on	  the	  climate	  system	  to	  reduce	  uncertainties	  is	  essential,	  policy-­‐makers	  also	  need	  a	  way	  to	  assess	  the	  possible	  consequences	  of	  different	  decisions,	  including	  taking	  no	  action,	  within	  the	  context	  of	  known	  
uncertainties”	  (Webster	  et.	  al.,	  2003).	  Webster	  goes	  on	  to	  say	  that:	  	   Decision-­‐making	  under	  uncertainty	  is	  an	  appropriate	  framework	  for	  the	  climate	  problem	  because	  of	  two	  basic	  premises:	  (i)	  the	  cumulative	  nature	  of	  atmospheric	  greenhouse	  gases,	  and	  the	  inertia	  of	  the	  oceans,	  means	  that	  if	  one	  waits	  to	  resolve	  the	  amount	  of	  climate	  change	  in	  2050	  or	  2100	  by	  perfectly	  observing	  it,	  it	  will	  take	  decades	  or	  centuries	  to	  alter	  observable	  trends—effective	  mitigation	  action	  must	  be	  started	  decades	  before	  the	  climate	  changes	  of	  concern	  are	  actually	  observed;	  (ii)	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  our	  uncertainty	  about	  future	  climate	  change	  may	  be	  unavoidable—details	  of	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climate	  and	  weather	  over	  longer	  periods	  of	  time	  are	  likely	  to	  remain	  unpredictable	  to	  some	  degree…thus,	  informed	  climate	  policy	  decisions	  require	  current	  estimates	  of	  the	  uncertainty	  in	  consequences	  for	  a	  range	  of	  possible	  actions	  (Webster	  et.	  al.,	  2003).	  	  Framing	  the	  scientific	  argument	  in	  terms	  of	  risk	  mitigation	  begins	  to	  resolve	  the	  problem	  in	  two	  ways.	  First,	  it	  presents	  the	  potential	  risks	  of	  global	  warming	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  properly	  acknowledges	  the	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  climate	  science	  and	  the	  epistemological	  nature	  of	  knowledge	  obtained	  through	  scientific	  inquiry.	  Second,	  it	  provides	  a	  reason	  to	  act	  now	  despite	  the	  lack	  of	  finality	  in	  assessment	  of	  the	  science.	  Dissenters	  may	  still	  not	  adhere	  to	  the	  anthropogenic	  climate	  change	  hypothesis,	  but	  if	  they	  were	  thinking	  about	  the	  problem	  in	  terms	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  risk	  mitigation	  instead	  of	  a	  false	  dichotomy	  of	  absolute	  certainty	  and	  knowledge	  affirmation,	  those	  who	  are	  risk	  adverse	  may	  be	  willing	  to	  agree	  on	  policy	  intervention	  without	  having	  to	  adhere	  to	  the	  global	  warming	  hypothesis.	  Implementing	  climate	  policy	  under	  a	  risk	  mitigation	  framework	  then	  becomes	  like	  an	  insurance	  policy	  where	  many	  don’t	  envision	  ever	  having	  to	  use	  it,	  but	  buy	  into	  it	  anyway	  because	  it	  isn’t	  worth	  taking	  the	  chance.	  Although	  reframing	  the	  climate	  debate	  in	  terms	  of	  risk	  mitigation	  will	  not	  resolve	  all	  the	  problems	  currently	  preventing	  a	  policy	  response,	  it	  is	  nonetheless	  a	  first	  and	  necessary	  step	  that	  lays	  the	  groundwork	  for	  a	  rational	  and	  pragmatic	  approach	  to	  dealing	  with	  climate	  change.	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